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In the current investigation, we modified the high Go low No-Go Sustained Attention to 
Response Task (SART) by replacing the single response on Go trials with a dual response 
(dual response SART or DR SART). In three experiments a total of 80 participants completed 
the SART and versions of the DR SART in which response probabilities varied from 50-50, 
through 70-30 to 90-10. The probability of No-Go withhold stimuli was .11 in all 
experiments. Using a dynamic utility based model proposed by Peebles and Bothell (2004) 
we predicted that the 50-50 DR-SART would dramatically reduce commission errors. 
Additionally, the model predicted that the probability of commission errors to be an 
increasing function of response frequency. Both predictions were confirmed. Although the 
increasing rate of commission errors with response probability can also be accommodated by 
the rationale originally proposed for the SART by its creators (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) the fact that the current DR SART results and SART findings in 
general can be accommodated by a utility model without need for any attention processes is a 

















     Every day, we find ourselves in situations that require us to remain attentive over short 
periods of time. It could be keeping an eye on traffic signals, or making sure you catch your 
flight details on the screens at the airport. Being unable to do so could have costly 
consequences, in the former case it could mean your life and the lives of others; in the latter 
case you could miss your connecting flight and be stuck in transit limbo for days. Either way, 
it is important that we are able to sustain attention until the task is complete. But what exactly 
is sustained attention? 
     The Encyclopaedia Britannica (McCallum, 2014) broadly describes sustained attention as 
a state in which attention must be maintained over time, often found in ‘watchkeeping’ 
activities where an observer must continuously monitor a  situation in which significant, but 
usually infrequent and unpredictable, events may occur. The creators of the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART) presented a more precise definition of sustained 
attention: it is ‘the ability to self-sustain, mindful, conscious processing of stimuli whose 
repetitive, non-arousing qualities would otherwise lead to habituation and distraction to other 
stimuli ’ (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997, p.748). Subsequently, and 
more pertinent to the current study, Langer and Eickhoff (2013) define sustained attention as 
the process of sustaining efficient conscious stimulus processing over periods longer than 
about 10 seconds up to many minutes. 
     Laboratory research and observations in the field have shown that sustaining attention to 
simple, monotonous tasks is perceived as highly demanding and effortful, causing subjective 
strain or perhaps even fatigue over time (Langner & Eickhoff, 2013). Subsequently, several 
researchers have proposed that such subjective experiences as well as concurrent objective 
difficulties in maintaining performance levels are a direct result of depletion of attentional 
resources that is caused by continuous allocation of attention  (Grier et al., 2003; Helton 
2009; Helton et al. 2005, Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009; Helton & Warm, 2008). In contrast, 
others have argued that cognitively more challenging or interesting tasks like video/computer 
gaming (as opposed to radar monitoring), may place similar or higher demands on attention 
but still fail to evoke any subjective experiences of strain and fatigue or even objective 
performance deterioration over time; instead such tasks can actually induce a positive ‘flow’ 
experience (Langner & Eickhoff, 2013). Subsequently, Langner & Eickhoff (2013) argue that 
negative subjective experiences in prolonged simple, repetitive tasks can be interpreted as 
4 
 
reflecting the experience of boredom (Scerbo, 1998), which previous studies have indicated 
as having an association with increased absentmindedness/mindlessness and mind-wandering 
(Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; 
O’Connell et al. 2006; Robertson et al. 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004).  
     The basic experimental paradigm for assessing vigilant or sustained attention involves 
participants monitoring their environment for a (more or less frequently occurring) pre-
specified target. Most research tends to use either of the following paradigm subtypes:  
(a) sustained covert (i.e., silent) target counting.  
(b) continuous stimulus detection (i.e., non-cued simple reaction time tasks) which does not 
require stimulus identification since all presented stimuli are targets. There is only one 
invariable response, and the only uncertain aspect is the exact moment of stimulus 
occurrence.  
 (c) continuous stimulus discrimination (i.e., non-cued Go/No-Go tasks), where targets and 
non-targets are presented in an intermixed fashion (typically unpredictably), with targets 
requiring a response and non-targets requiring no overt response. Traditionally, Go/No-Go 
tasks used in research contain many more non-target (No-Go) than target (Go) events, such as 
Mackworth’s Clock Task (Mackworth, 1948) or the classic Continuous Performance Task 
(CPT; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956).  Recently, ‘reverse’ vigilance 
paradigms with more Go than No-Go events, such as Conners’s CPT (Conners, 1994) or the 
SART (Robertson et al., 1997), have garnered much interest. The SART in particular has 
been the go-to ‘reverse’ vigilance paradigm for many researchers studying sustained 
attention.  
The SART  
     The original SART procedure (Robertson et al., 1997) involved the visual presentation of 
225 single digits (25 for each of the 9 digits) over 4.3 minutes. A single trial was comprised 
of (see Figure 1): 
I – A digit presented for 250 msec. 





Fig. 1 A single trial sequence during the SART 
Subjects responded to each digit with key presses (go stimuli), except on the 25 (11.1%) 
occasions that the digit 3 (no-go stimulus) was presented. Robertson and colleagues 
distributed the digit 3 throughout the 225 trials in a pre-fixed quasi-random manner. 
Furthermore the digits were randomly allocated to 5 various font sizes to ensure that the 
numerical value would be processed and not peripheral features of the no-response target. 
‘Oops!’ Performance correlates of everyday attentional failures in traumatic brain 
injured and normal subjects. 
    As mentioned earlier, Robertson et al. (1997) define sustained attention as ‘the ability to 
self-sustain, mindful, conscious processing of stimuli whose repetitive, non-arousing qualities 
would otherwise lead to habituation and distraction to other stimuli ’. Using examples like 
keeping vegetable peelings while throwing away the vegetables themselves or pouring cream 
into black coffee, they illustrate action slips which they believe may have a possible link with 
sustained attention abilities. They argue that this link and thereby the conception of the 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) is important for two reasons: First, attentional 
performance measures that correlate with slips of action (in the normal population) have not 
been very successful and Robertson and colleagues believe that this is due to inadequate 
measures of sustained attention. Second, they argue that there is insufficient characterization 
of attention deficits in patients with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI).   
     Robertson and colleagues argue that action slips among the normal population and 
attentional failures in TBI patients share some (less extreme) characteristics, and that these 
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slips are influenced by transient attention lapses to tasks symptomatic of deficient sustained 
attention. They believe that the difficulty in establishing dependable performance correlates 
of sustained attention failures in TBI patients may be due to the nature of the sustained 
attention paradigms employed. Robertson and colleagues suggest the near ceiling 
performance levels commonly found may not require conscious deliberate processes or 
sustained attention at all, but instead targets may be detected automatically in the sense of 
Schneider & Shiffrin (1977). 
     Robertson and colleagues believed that reversing the relative probability of Go and No-Go 
stimuli would create a situation where responses to the common go stimuli become 
automatized. They argued that without sustained attention to their responses participants 
would mindlessly execute the automatized pre-potent response on No-Go trials. Thus, the 
frequency of responses to No-Go or withhold stimuli (i.e. commission errors) provides the 
sought sensitive measure of a person’s ability to sustain attention. This was their justification 
for using a continuous performance paradigm with frequent key presses to go stimuli and a 
requirement to withhold key presses to occasional No-Go stimuli. They argued that this kind 
of task requires high levels of continuous attention and would be sensitive to a ‘transitory 
reduction in attention’ (attention lapses) with minimal involvement of other cognitive 
processes such as, memory, planning, and general intellectual effort. To test their hypotheses 
Robertson and colleagues conducted a rigorous set of experiments analysing the relationship 
between SART measures and everyday attentional lapses and other cognitive failures among 
normal controls; and the relationship between everyday attention failures and SART 
performance and brain damage severity among people with traumatic brain injury. 
     Robertson and colleagues found that performance of normal control subjects on the 
SART, which equates to a lack of commission errors to the No-Go stimuli, significantly 
correlated with self-reports of attentional and ‘cognitive failures’ in everyday life along with 
informant reports of similar failures. They concluded that difficulty in maintaining attention 
was a more satisfactory explanation for failures on the task than difficulty in inhibiting 
responses, which could be a problem since subjects would need to pay attention to reign in 
the tendency to automatically make a response to every stimulus. The SART measures 
demonstrated strong relationships with other validated measures of sustained attention but 
weaker relationships with measures of other attentional capacities including those with 
response inhibition components. Additionally, Robertson and colleagues were able to predict 
errors of commission (key presses to withhold stimuli) based on performance on correct Go 
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trials preceding the presentation of a target, i.e. subjects’ response times (RT) speed up prior 
to commission error responses. This is consistent with their argument that an error is not just 
an isolated failure in withholding a response but the result of a failure to maintain an 
optimum approach for the duration of the task.    
Look! It moves! – Evolution of the SART 
     The following decade saw the proliferation of the SART as a test of sustained attention. In 
the early 2000s a sequential SART was used where the number stimuli (1-9) where presented 
in a fixed rather than random order (Dockree et al., 2006; Manly et al., 2003), followed by 
SARTs with cues and response locking (Dockree et al., 2004; Dockree et al., 2006; Manly et 
al., 2004). A dual task version dubbed the DART (Dual attention to Response Task) was used 
by Dockree et al., (2006) where in addition to button presses to Go stimuli and no responses 
to No-Go targets, subjects were required to press a different button to grey coloured digits. 
O’Connell, Bellgrove, Dockree, & Robertson, (2006) used a SART that involved regular 
beeps to remind participants to concentrate on what they were doing. SARTs using global-
local stimuli (Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009; Helton, 2009; Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & 
Sawers, 2010) and SARTs using feature present/absent stimuli were used in multiple studies 
(Helton & Russell, 2011; Stevenson, Russell, & Helton, 2011). Some studies have 
incorporated reliable or unreliable warnings in the SART (Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011) 
and others have used picture stimuli instead of digits (Head & Helton, 2012). There has also 
been an auditory and coloured versions of the SART used to great success (Seli, Cheyne, 
Barton, & Smilek, 2012; Smallwood, 2013). 
      In these variants of the SART, researchers customized the task based on the needs and 
requirements of their particular study. The SART has been used to study the effects of age, 
gender, and education on sustained attention (Carriere, Cheyne, Solman, & Smilek, 2010; 
Chan, 2001), and to investigate traumatic brain injury (Chan, 2005; Dockree et al., 2004; 
Manly et al., 2003; O’Keeffe, Dockree, & Robertson, 2004; O’Keeffe, Dockree, Moloney, 
Carton, & Robertson, 2007; Robertson et al., 1997; Whyte, Grieb-Neff, Gantz, & Polansky, 
2006). It is a popular tool to assess attention difficulties in ADHD (Bellgrove, Hawi, Gill, & 
Robertson, 2006; Bellgrove, Hawi, Kirley, Gill, & Robertson, 2005; Johnson, Kelly, et al., 
2007; Johnson, Robertson, et al., 2007; Manly et al., 2001; Mullins, Bellgrove, Gill,& 
Robertson, 2005; O’Connell et al., 2006 ) and to study attention related errors (Cheyne, 
Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009). Versions of the SART have been used to study 
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schizophrenia (Chan et al., 2009; Seok et al., 2012), sleep disorders (Van Schie et al., 2012) 
and depression (Farrin et al., 2003; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, & Obosawin, 2007). 
The SART has also been used in a study assessing work stress and burnout (Linden, Keijsers, 
Eling, & Schaijk, 2005), and to look at stress-induced cognitive effects of natural disasters 
(Helton, Head, & Kemp, 2011). A study even analysed the benefits of chewing gum on 
sustained attention based on the SART (Johnson, Muneem, & Miles, 2013). The SART is so 
popular today that when the words ‘sustained attention tasks’ are entered into Google, the 
first four or five results all link to the SART. 
      Despite its widespread use there has always been debate regarding the precise nature of 
the deficit measured by SART performance. Robertson et al., (1997) themselves 
acknowledge that the SART is sensitive to the ability to inhibit a response because if subjects 
aren’t attending they will not notice what it is that they have to inhibit too, but Robertson and 
colleagues believed that their sustained attention argument is more credible. It has been 
variously argued that rather than being a measure of sustained attention, SART commission 
errors measure  impulsive responding (Helton, 2009; Helton et al., 2009), response strategy 
(Helton et al., 2011; Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010), executive motor control, 
(Head & Helton, 2013; Head & Helton, 2014) and the impact of speed-accuracy trade-offs 
(Peebles & Bothell, 2004; Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013). 
The ghost in the shell – What does the SART truly measure? 
     The debate over SART measurement properties is crucial given its widespread use by 
researchers. Several experiments have been conducted that challenge the claim that the SART 
is a measure of sustained attention rather than motor control (response inhibition, response 
strategy or motor impulsivity). For the sake of exposition the measurement properties of the 
SART are explained individually, but it should be noted that they are all interlinked. 
      Response Inhibition: 
      In a follow up study (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999) reiterated their 
argument that performance on the SART requires sustained attention rather than a putative 
response inhibition capacity. They argued that performance is determined by the duration 
over which a person must maintain attention over their actions and that this demand supports 
the SART’s relationship to common attention lapses. Conversely results from more recent 
studies suggest that failure to inhibit a pre-potent response rather than failure to perceive a 
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critical stimulus is most likely the cause of SART commission errors (Helton et al. 2005). 
Stevenson et al., (2011) argue that these errors are what Robertson et al. (1997) interpret as 
lapses of attention whereas in traditional low-Go vigilance tasks decrease in detections over 
time (vigilance decrement) is the measure of interest. Despite participants in the SART being 
perceptually aware of the No-Go stimuli, they will often be unable to withhold a motor 
response (Carter, Russell, & Helton, 2013). Stevenson et al., (2011) believe that this leads to 
awareness of the task stimuli being (somewhat) masked by the demand exerted on motor 
inhibition. Consequently commission errors may occur because participants fail to 
perceptually identify the critical stimulus, or because perceptual identification does not itself 
necessarily prevent production of the pre-potent response. 
     Carter, Russell, & Helton (2013) explored the roles of attention and response inhibition by 
contrasting performance in SART and TFT tasks using highly predictable fixed ordered 
stimuli (1-9 sequentially) or unpredictable randomized digit sequences. They found more 
errors of commission in the unpredictable SARTrandom condition, contradicting a previous 
study by O’Connell et al. (2009) who claimed that response inhibition demands were lower in 
the SARTfixed than in the SARTrandom. Additionally Carter et al. found errors of commission 
were minimal in the TFTs (both random and fixed), which suggest that there is little need to 
inhibit responses in the low Go TFT task unlike the SART where the need to inhibit 
responses to rare No-Go stimuli is high. In fact, commission errors will occur on the TFT 
when there is a perceptual error, but they don’t happen very often with clear high contrast 
digits. Carter, Russell, & Helton (2013) argue that the SART should not be used to measure 
the ability of subjects to sustain attention to external stimuli. They point out that since 
response inhibition is normally measured by the number of inhibition failures, i.e. inability to 
stop a response, errors of commission in the SART reflect failures of response inhibition not 
lapses in sustained attention. Analogous to arguments made by Stevenson et al., (2011), 
Carter, Russell, & Helton (2013) state that errors of commission in the SART are commonly 
made when the participant is completely aware of the No-Go stimuli but is unable to inhibit a 
pre-potent motor response. Consequently the numerous studies using the SART to measure 
sustained attention have likely measured something quite different, most likely strategies that 
relate to inhibition of a pre-potent motor response. 




  Motor Impulsivity: 
     Helton (2005) and Helton et al.,(2009) argue that the SART may be contaminated by 
impulsivity, and the constant responding to neutral signals leads to the development of a 
‘ballistic feed-forward motor program’ which causes difficulty for the supervisory attention 
system in its capacity to control or inhibit. Thus a participant in the SART could be fully 
aware of the stimuli (perceptual awareness) but be unable to inhibit or disrupt this ballistic 
motor program. In fact, Head and Helton (2013) report that participants in their laboratory 
often recollect being fully aware during errors of commission on the SART  while at the same 
time are unable to physically stop their hand from responding. Helton (2009) suggests that 
the SART’s response format encourages conservativeness, i.e. the participants often try to 
harness or control their responses; and that this does not translate into being a failure of signal 
detection.  
     Additional evidence for a motor decoupling perspective on the SART includes the fact 
that task instructions seem to modify performance. Task instructions for the SART 
traditionally require participants to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, but when 
participants are asked to slow down (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012) errors of commission 
dramatically decrease. Furthermore, when participants are instructed (via an audible 
metronome) to delay their responses (Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012), errors 
of commission decrease. In fact, as Helton (2009) ironically points out, even research by 
Robertson and his colleagues (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999) supports an 
impulsivity perspective on the SART: increase in the probability of Go stimuli and an 
increase in overall event rate leads to increased errors of commission. In other words, people 
are impulsive because the benefit of fast responses (impulsivity) outweighs its costs.  
     Response Strategy: 
     Several studies have presented evidence indicating that the incidence of commission errors 
in the SART reflects response strategy rather than lapses in sustained attention (Head & 
Helton, 2014; Head, Russell, Dorahy, Neumann, & Helton, 2012; Helton et al., 2009; Peebles 
& Bothell, 2004). Helton (2009) conducted a study where participants performed global–
local letter stimuli detection tasks using either the SART or the TFT. His findings indicated 
that performance on the SART changed rapidly over time, and demonstrated an inverse 
relationship between errors of commission and correct response reaction times (identical to 
Roberson and colleagues’ initial findings). These results were regarded as evidence of 
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strategic slowing. Helton (2009) also argued that participants in the global–local version of 
the SART strategically increased their response times in order to inhibit the impulsivity 
which caused the commission errors. There was no comparable strategic change in a 
perceptually identical TFT. Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & Sawers (2010) interpret the Helton 
(2009) results as clear evidence for the role of response strategy in the determination of 
commission errors in the SART.  
    Furthermore, Helton et al. (2005) and (Helton 2009) argue that the SART is primarily a 
measure of speed-accuracy trade-off and response strategy. They suggest that errors of 
omission may be ‘tactical forced rest-stops enabling enhanced inhibitory control’, i.e. 
participants are taking a breather. Helton, Head, & Russell (2011) introduced warning cues of 
varying reliability into the SART to investigate its measurement characteristics and argue that 
if the SART is indeed a measure of sustained attention then reliable-warning cues should 
reduce errors of omission. But if Helton et al. (2005) and Helton’s (2009) argument is correct 
errors of omission should occur more frequently with reliable-warning cues because errors of 
omission may be tactically used to improve commission error performance. Errors of 
omission were in fact higher in the reliable-warning cue SART than either a no- warning cue 
or an unreliable-warning cue SART adding further credibility to Helton and colleagues 
argument that the omission errors are tactical rest stops. This also provided additional support 
for the perspective that the SART is a better measure of impulse control and response 
strategy than sustained attention. 
     Mind Wandering: 
     Cheyne et al., (2009) presented a three-state attentional model of task 
engagement/disengagement that was applied to the SART. Based on the model, attentional 
disengagement during the SART can be described in three distinct states of mind-wandering: 
State 1: Occurrent task inattention:  which involves a brief or partial waning of detailed 
processing of moment-to-moment stimulus leading to a disengagement of attention from the 
features of the task. Commonly known as ‘tuning out’. This state is reflected in the variably 
of RTs in the SART, and is especially observed via shorter mean RTs in the trials 




State 2: Generic task inattention: in which attention to the general task-relevant aspects of the 
environment is reduced but the individual continues to demonstrate well-practiced automatic 
responding. Commonly known as ‘going through the motions’ or ‘zoning out’.  Reflected in 
the SART via anticipations, i.e. responses on Go trials that are way too fast to be responses to 
the Go stimuli, but could instead be a result of subjects anticipating the presentation of Go 
stimuli. 
State 3: Response disengagement: which is evidenced by gross behavioural indicators of 
mind-wandering. Subjects may only be responsive to the most intrusive aspects of the task 
environment. Seen in the SART via omissions, i.e. the failure to respond to Go stimuli. Errors 
of omission have been noted to occur in the SART with both fixed and random intervals and 
researchers have interpreted them as a break from task engagement reflecting deteriorating 
attention (Johnson, Robertson, et al., 2007 as cited in Cheyne et al., (2009); Manly et al., 
1999). 
     Various other studies have also shown that performance on the SART is a reliable index of 
mind wandering across a wide range of experimental methods (Cheyne et al., 2009; Christoff 
et al., 2009; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2008). Yanko 
and Spalek (2013) argue that repeated engagement in a task will often result in gradual 
transition from being consciously aware and in control of one’s actions, to a state where 
automatic processes take over our actions placing a lower demand on attentional resources. 
Jackson & Balota, (2012) argue that the SART’s tendency to induce this shift from controlled 
to automatic processing is what makes it susceptible to mind-wandering. 
     Speed-accuracy: 
     Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, (2013) argue that since many studies that use the 
SART to observe sustained attention do not include RT data with mean error data, it is not 
possible to evaluate if improvements are caused by improved sustained attention or by 
strategic shifts along the speed–accuracy trade-off curve. But when mean RTs have been 
reported, the reductions in errors were also accompanied by slower RTs (Manly et al., 2004), 
indicating speed–accuracy trade-off effects.  When Seli et al., (2013) investiged the effect of 
speed-accuracy trade-offs in the SART, they found that commission errors were a systematic 
function of various manipulations in response delay. Participants that were responding with a 
400ms delay (after stimulus onset) produced the most errors; those responding with a 600ms 
delay made fewer errors and those responding with a 800ms delay produced even fewer 
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errors. Even omission errors were lower with a 600ms and 800ms delay when compared to 
the standard SART and 400ms delay SART. Their results are a clear indication that 
manipulation of response delay affects error rate, providing further evidence that the SART is 
indeed susceptible to speed–accuracy trade-off effects.  
     Helton et al., (2009) designed an experiment to test if performance on the SART was 
influenced by prior exposure to emotional stimuli. The study also examined the influence that 
speed-accuracy trade-offs has on SART performance as demonstrated by Peebles and Bothell 
(2004), specifically the negative correlation between RT and errors of commission. They 
found that participants in their study prevented entering inappropriate responses by reducing 
the overall rate of response as illustrated by the high negative correlation between RT of 
appropriate responses and errors of commission (r = -.61). Therefore participants who were 
slow made fewer commission errors than participants who were faster. Helton et al., (2009) 
believe that subjects sacrifice speed for better accuracy and their results also support the 
argument that the SART is a better measure of response strategy and impulsive responding 
than attention.  
    Finally, a study by Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek (2012) investigated the effects of altering 
speed-accuracy tradeoffs via instructions, e.g. subjects were asked to focus on accuracy 
instead of both speed and accuracy  (standard SART instructions state that speed and 
accuracy are equally important in successfully completing the task). They found that when 
instructions emphasized accuracy over speed there were fewer errors and a shift in the 
distribution of Go trial RTs (increased RTs and reduced errors). Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek 
(2012) argue that when subjects are given instructions for sustained attention tasks that 
emphasize both speed and accuracy it creates errors resulting from attempts by participants to 
conform to the ‘misleading requirement for speed’, which they believe becomes commingled 
with errors caused by attention lapses. Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek (2012) as an extension of 
remarks by Edwards (1961) argue that instructions such as those accompanying the SART 
are contradictory as speed and accuracy require modes of responding that are incompatible.  
     In addition to the debate over what the SART actually measures, the external validity of 
the SART has been questioned by Wallace, Kass, and Stanny (2002) and Whyte et al. (2006) 
who failed to show a significant correlation between performance on the SART and the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) which Robertson et al., (1997) used to demonstrate 
real world implications of the SART. Research by Whyte et al., (2006) in particular failed to 
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replicate any of the key findings from the original research by Robertson and colleagues: that 
patients with TBI made more errors of commission on the SART than an uninjured control 
group, and that the number of errors correlated with everyday attention lapses as measured by 
the CFQ.   
      Sustained attention, by definition (e.g. Langer and Eichoff, 2013 as already noted) is 
about maintaining perceptual awareness to external stimuli, and not the setting of a speed–
accuracy response policy or the inhibition of feed-forward motor programs. But many 
researchers, including Robertson and colleagues, still continue to use the SART as a measure 
of sustained attention (Dockree et al., 2004; Manly et al., 2004; Shaw et al., 2013) and make 
extensive efforts to salvage the SART as such a measure (Manly et al., 2003; Cheyne, 
Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Connell et al., 2008; Seli, Cheyne, Barton, & Smilek, 2012). 
Manly et al. (1999), Farrin et al. (2003), and Van der Linden et al. (2005) have all found 
strong support for the Robertson’s original claim. Van der Linden et al’s., (2005) research on 
teacher burnout found that self-reports of cognitive complaints during the SART task to be 
significantly related to both SART errors and burnout status, and Farrin et al., (2003) 
demonstrated clear SART differences between depressed and non-depressed soldiers. 
Additionally, a study by Chan (2005) testing the sensitivity of the SART and the Monotone 
Counting Test found that subjects with mild TBI performed significantly worse in both tests 
than normal controls. In fact, performance on the SART was more sensitive to mild TBI than 
the Monotone Counting Test in the sample leading to Chan’s (2005) conclusion that the 
SART is a valid measure of sustained attention. 
     Additionally, it is important to note that detecting a sudden onset (which could be the 
trigger for a pre-potent response) is not the same as identifying the digit or response class and 
even then it may be necessary to invoke a separate inhibition process. Multiple processes 
cascade at different rates in the brain. So it is possible for sudden onset to initiate a prepared 
pre-potent response before the stimulus is identified (a fraction later) and it is possible that 
stimulus identification is the signal to a stop-reaction like instruction, which will not prevent 
the response if it comes too late (Aron, 2011). So while it is important to understand the 
relevance of impulsivity, stimulus and response uncoupling, and inhibition of pre-potent 
responses, none of them may necessarily challenge Robertson and colleagues’ claim that in 
order to control the pre-potent response one has to be paying attention to the action. Global 
strategies, such as setting a speed-accuracy criterion are insufficient because RTs change in 
response to errors (Robertson et al., 1997). This is where a dynamic model such as that 
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presented by Peebles & Bothell (2004) has advantage – their model has mechanisms that 
support dynamic strategy changes, which while accounting for response inhibition, motor 
impulsivity, stimulus and perceptual decoupling, exposes the limitations of global 
explanations. 
To check, or not to check –Modelling Performance in the Sustained Attention to 
Response Task. 
     Peebles & Bothell (2004) proposed a computational model for human performance in the 
SART based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) which 
presented two competing strategies to explain the factors that may be responsible for the 
speed-accuracy trade-off often seen in the SART. The ACT-R 5.0 (Anderson et al., 2004)is a 
version of the ACT-R cognitive architecture that adds perceptual and motor modules giving 
the ACT-R, visual attention and processing mechanisms, basic speech and audition 
capabilities, including elements of motor control to simulate interaction with a computer 
keyboard and mouse. Peebles & Bothell, (2004) built an ACT-R model which mimics the 
manner of interaction between the SART and human participants, via a mouse and text on a 
computer screen (see Figure 2).  
The model contains two competing strategies: 
I-Encode and click:  The faster option, but less accurate because the model straight away 
clicks the mouse after detecting any stimulus on the screen. 
 II-Encode and check: The slower option, but more accurate because the model first checks 
the stimulus to ensure that it should click the mouse and only does so when appropriate. 
     By presenting this strategy choice as an alternative explanation regarding performance, the 
model calls in question the role of sustained attention in the SART and provides an 
explanation for how the speed-accuracy trade-off occurs in the SART. According to Peebles 
& Bothell, the utilities of the two strategies (‘encode and click’ vs. ‘encode and check’) begin 
equal but change dynamically from trial to trial as a function of their histories of success and 
failure. Consequently the likelihood of application of each strategy varies from trial to trial 
capturing the dependence of Go response times on the recency of a commission error. When 
the probability of error is low the ‘encode and click’ strategy builds its utility over trials 
making this the more likely strategy, except after an error has occurred. When the probability 
of error is high, then the ‘encode and check’ strategy wins out but its high time cost lessens 
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its utility quite quickly. So probability of error has the effect of modifying the utility of each 
strategy over trials. In this way their model relates the likelihood of commission errors to 
stimulus probability. Also, in addition to accounting for the response strategy and speed-
accuracy aspects of the SART, the shift between strategies based on utility also explains why 
subjects are unable to inhibit a response or why they are prone to impulsivity (‘encode and 
check’ being the predominant strategy in both cases). 
 
Fig. 2 Flow of processing in the ACT-R SART model. (Peebles & Bothell, 2004) 
   Furthermore, according to Robertson et al. to get a commission error two conditions are 
necessary: there is a) a pre-potent response and b) there is a lapse in attention. In the SART 
after the first minute or so, the pre-potent response will have been established, but the pre-
potent response alone may not be sufficient to produce an error –an attention lapse is required 
as well. An important question then is whether the pre-potent response has to be controlled by 
attention on each trial or whether participants adopt some overarching strategy (e.g. ‘encode 
and check’ on every trial). The fact that commission errors occur at all suggests either that 
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subjects don’t adopt an overarching strategy, or as Peebles and Bothell suggest, the strategy is 
subject to moment to moment variation. The strategies people adopt are known; their Go 
responses are faster before commission errors and slower afterwards (Robertson et al., 1997). 
This is not consistent with a static speed-accuracy trade-off or other constant strategy. Any 
strategy must be contingent upon recent events as Peebles and Bothell propose. 
 
     Subjects in the SART are given instructions which are impossible to carry out. They are 
told to respond as quickly to Go stimuli as possible without making errors on No-Go trials. 
According to the model, utility is a key concept here. Finding the balance between benefits 
(of fast correct responses) and costs (of commission and omission errors) is key. In the SART 
where No-Go stimuli are rare (11%) the benefits of speed far outweigh the cost of 
commission errors because there are few opportunities for error and so participants will 
frequently opt for the ‘encode and click’ strategy. Probability of cost from ‘encode and click’ 
is p = 1/9 = .11. But if the SART, for example, has two different responses categories with a 
50-50 probability, then out of the 225 trials in a block each response category will be equally 
presented on 100 of 225 trials. The opportunity for error occurs on 25 (No-go stimuli) plus 
100 (go stimuli in each response category) = 125/225 = .55 of trials if the one response option 
was adopted throughout. Because ‘encode and click’ will result in errors on a majority of 
trials, ‘encode and check’ should be adopted much of the time. 
 
The Dual Response-Sustained Attention to Response Task 
     The present study explores a dual response version of the SART (DR-SART), where 
participants pressed one key for digits less than 5, and another key for digits greater than 5 
(Go stimuli), but withheld response to the digit 5 (No-Go stimulus). There are two primary 
expectations of the DR-SART; the first is that it will prevent the automatization of responses 
thereby disrupting the feed-forward ballistic motor program. In the single response SART, 
the participant should have the single response in a high state of preparedness ready to react 
whenever a sudden onset signal occurs on the screen. In contrast, the dual response version 
prevents response preparation. Consequently automatized production of a pre-potent 
response, i.e. a commission error, is less likely in 50:50 dual response situations. Second in a 
dual task participants must scrutinize the stimulus and identify its numerical class (< 5, 5, > 
5) in order to make a correct response choice on Go trials. Because in a random sequence the 
subject cannot know in advance the stimulus that will occur next, a similar degree of scrutiny 
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must accompany No-Go stimuli, meaning that No-Go stimuli will be identified and not 
merely detected as sudden onset events. Again the effect of introduction of response choice is 
to cause a shift from ‘encode and click’ to ‘encode and check’ with resultant reduced 
commission errors and longer RTs. 
     The primary aim of the following experiments is to compare results from single and dual 
response versions of the SART. If the experiment yields the results expected (reduced 
commission errors in the DR-SART), follow up experiments manipulating the relative 
probability of the two Go responses become worth pursuing. The expectation is that the 
proportion of commission errors to the No-Go stimulus will increase with the probability of 
the more frequent choice alternative. This is because the pre-potency or strength of one 
response over another increases the greater the frequency of its use. Consequently when one 
response is highly likely, the relative reward for fast responses becomes greater encouraging 
an ‘encode and click’ strategy over an ‘encode and check’ strategy. In terms of Peebles and 
Bothell’s model, in a 90-10 DR-SART the more frequently occurring stimuli will be 
presented on 180 of 225 trials; because the more common response class occurs on such a 
high proportion of trials, subjects should adopt ‘encode and click’ as their predominant 
strategy. The opportunity for error occurs on 25 (No-Go) plus 20 (less frequent group) = 
45/225 = .20 of trials. The speed benefits from ‘encode and click’ (the more common 
response) outweigh the costs of improbable errors. 
 
     If as predicted, commission errors in the 90-10 condition are intermediate between the 
standard SART and the 50-50 DR-SART, then a 70-30 version will be run as Experiment 3. 
In the 70-30 DR-SART the more frequent group will be presented on 140 of 225 trials. The 
opportunity for error occurs on 25 (No-Go stimulus) plus 60 (less frequent group) = 85/225= 
.38 of trials. The costs of more frequent errors outweigh the benefits of speed on relatively 
fewer trials and subjects should more often adopt the ‘encode and check’ strategy. Because 
the Peebles & Bothell model predicts that the likelihood of ‘encode and click’ is proportional 
to the probability of a response category, we predict that the production of commission errors 
by a particular responding unit will lie in order (from high to low): Single, Dual 90, Dual 70, 








     Eighty students from the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand, 
participated in this study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The 
research was approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.   
Materials and Procedure 
     Participants were tested in individual cubicles in a psychology laboratory at the university. 
They were given an information sheet and a consent form which they signed. Participants 
were seated approximately 50cm in front of a computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm, 1680 x 
1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) that was mounted at eye level. Their head movements were 
not restrained. Stimuli presentation and response accuracy and timing were achieved using E-
prime 2.0 software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).   
Experiment 1 
     Two SARTs were used, the original SART and a dual response version of the SART (the 
DR-SART). Forty participants (24 female, 16 male) were assigned a subject number at 
random prior to undertaking the experiment, even subject numbers ran the dual response 
version and odd subject numbers took the single response SART. Participants ranged in age 
between 18 and 33 years (M = 21.93 years, SD = 3.63). Twenty participants were assigned to 
each version. The single response SART required participants to respond to stimuli (numbers 
1 to 9) by pressing both mouse buttons to frequently-occurring Go stimuli and withhold 
responses to rarely occurring No-Go target (the number 5). The dual response version 
required participants to press the left mouse button for numbers from 1 to 4, and the right 
mouse for numbers from 6 to 9. The sets 1-4 and 6-9 were equiprobable. As in the single 
response version, responses were withheld to the number 5. Go stimuli occurred with a 
probability of 0.89 and No-Go targets occurred with a probability of 0.11. The tasks were 
each 4.3 min long and consisted of 225 trials. In each trial stimuli were presented for 250 ms, 
followed immediately by a 900 ms mask formed from a circle with a diagonal cross in the 
middle. From the off-set of the stimuli participants had a 900 ms window to register a 
response. Besides switching the No-Go target from 3 to 5, the single response SART was 
kept identical to the version run by Robertson et al. (1997). Digits varied in size and were 
randomly selected from font sizes of 48, 72, 94, 100 and 120 points, and were all the same 
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font. Each session was preceded by 18 practice trails with feedback informing participants of 
omission and commission errors.  
Experiment 2 
     The second experiment used a modified version of the DR-SART. The probabilities of the 
categories of the Go stimuli were changed from 50-50 to 90-10 for twenty participants (16 
female, 4 male). Participants ranged in age between 18 and 24 years (M = 19.8 years, SD = 
1.74). As in experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned subject numbers. Participants 
with odd numbers took a version of the experiment where the Go stimuli consisted of the 
numbers 1 to 4 ninety percent of the time. Conversely, participants with even subject 
numbers took a version of the experiment where the Go stimuli consisted of the numbers 6 to 
9 ninety percent of the time.  
Experiment 3 
     Similarly experiment 3 modified the DR-SART where the probabilities of categories of 
Go stimuli were 70-30 for twenty participants (13 female, 7 male). Participants ranged in age 
between 18 and 28 years (M = 20.45 years, SD = 2.96). As in experiment 1 and 2, participants 
were randomly assigned subject numbers. Participants with odd numbers took a version of 
the experiment where the Go stimuli consisted of the numbers 1 to 4 seventy percent of the 
time. Conversely, participants with even subject numbers took a version of the experiment 












Does the dual response requirement reduce errors of commission? 
     Commission errors fell from .448 in the single response condition to .186 in the dual (50-
50) condition. The difference of .262, 95% CI [.152, .368] was strongly statistically 
significant, t(38) = 4.987, p < .0001, 2-tail (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Experiment 1: mean proportion of errors and correct response times for the standard 
SART and 50-50 DR-SART 
                           Commission           Omission             Decision                 Correct RT (ms) 
Single                      0.448                   0.011                                                    351.3 
                                0.192                   0.017                                                     82.3 
Dual 50-50              0.186                   0.018                     0.057                       514.2 
                                0.143                   0.022                     0.036                       51.6       
Difference               0.262                  -0.007                                                   -162.9 
95% CI               .152 to .368          -.20 to .006                                           119 to 207 
Standard deviations in italics 
     Conversely, Omission errors do not appear to be affected by task.  The difference in 
omission errors between the single and dual tasks was .007, 95% CI [-.010, .020, t(38) = 
.794, p = .432, 2-tail. Experiment 1 provides no evidence that task (Single vs. Dual) affects 
omission errors. Finally correct response times were 163 ms slower, 95% CI [119, 207 ms] in 
the dual task , t(38) = 7.498, p < .0001, 2-tail. 
 
     In the single response SART the same response is made to all Go stimuli.  In the 50-50 
DR-SART the two responses are used equally often. When one response is made much 
more common does the rate of commission errors increase to approximate that in the 
single response SART?   
     We compared the single response SART, the 90-10 DR-SART and the 50-50 DR-SART. 
Experiment 2 provided the 90-10 DR-SART. Results indicated that commission errors in the 
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90-10 DR-SART were intermediate between the single response SART and 50-50 DR-SART. 
Therefore a 70-30 DR-SART was run as Experiment 3. Figure 3 illustrates errors in one panel 
and RTs in a second.  The error bars are 95% CI. Figure 3 shows that commission errors 
increase as response uncertainty decreases. Using information metrics, (Fitts and Posner, 
1967) uncertainty ranges from 1.0 in the dual 50-50, to .88 (70-30), .47 (90-10) and 0.0 in the 
single task. There is no uncertainty about which response to make in the single condition.  
The graphs illustrate that there are reliable differences in commission errors and RTs between 
all adjacent pairs except 70-30 and 50-50. Perhaps imbalance between the two responses has 
to exceed a threshold of at least 70-30 before the benefit of ‘encode and click’ exceeds the 
cost of the ‘encode and check’ strategy. The conclusion to be drawn from Figure 3 is that 
commission errors fall and RTs increase with uncertainty while response uncertainty has no 
effect on omissions and decision errors. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Mean proportion of errors and correct response times across all conditions 
     Analyses so far have considered error and RTs by task.  Errors and RTs have been pooled 
over high and low response categories.  We now examine errors made separately by the 
finger assigned to the high or the low occurrence category (but note the actual finger used 
was counterbalanced across subjects). Mean proportions of errors and correct RTs for each 
stimulus probability along with 95% CI are displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. 
Statistical treatment of these data are made difficult because the full set of response 
categories over the three experiments contains a mix of between subject (e.g. 90 vs. 70) and 
within subject (e.g. 90 vs. 10) comparisons.  Since all adjacent comparison involves 
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independent groups, the extent of the overlap between adjacent confidence intervals can be 
used to indicate the statistical significance of the difference between adjacent groups.  
 
 
Fig. 4 Mean proportion of errors based on response category 
 
      The more frequently a responding finger is used, the higher the proportion of commission 
and decision errors and the faster the responses are emitted. Predominantly commission and 
decision errors occur when a highly common response (90 or single response) is executed 
quickly. Rarely does execution of an infrequent response occur to high probability stimuli.  
Failure to respond at all within the 1.150 second time frame (omissions) appears unrelated to 
frequency of use of the responding finger.  If omissions occur because of lapses of attention, 
then lapses are independent of task conditions.  Further if omission errors reflect the need to 






Fig. 5 Correct response times based on response category 
 
Does making a commission error have the same consequences on following trials in dual 
and single response tasks? 
 
     Robertson and colleagues reported that responses prior to a correct withhold were 48 ms 
slower than those preceding a commission error. A similar result was found for the Single 
response group in the current experiment; the difference was 37 ms, 95% CI [13.9, 60.1], 
t(19) = 3.35, p = .003 2-tail (see Figure 6).  Commission errors occur when prior responses 
are faster (encode and click strategy).  
 
     Is the consequence of a commission error adoption of an ‘encode and check’ strategy and 
increased reaction times? Robertson and colleagues report that response times prior to a 
commission error were 35ms faster than response times immediately following an error. 
Those results are also mirrored in the current single response experiment, response times after 






Fig. 6 Mean response times for four trials before and after commission errors and correct 
responses on the single response SART 
 
     A similar analysis was performed on the correct and error response times for the 50-50 
DR-SART as illustrated in Figure 7. This time responses were not reliably slower prior to 
correct withholds than to commission errors ; mean difference 12.7 ms , 95% CI [-10.8 , 
36.1], t(17) = 1.14, p = .27 2-tail.  (17 df because two people made no commission errors). 
Perhaps the stronger requirement to check the identity of stimuli in dual task has lowered the 
rate of commission errors with the consequence that speed of responding is slower overall 
because of the need to check before making any response. However, responses prior to a 
commission error were faster than those following an error suggesting that response to a 
withhold stimulus was recognized and caused a change to a checking strategy; mean 
difference 43.1 ms, 95% CI [18.6, 67.7 ms], t(17) = 3.71, p = .002, 2-tail.   
 
     As can be seen in the Figure 7, responses following a decision error were slightly faster 
following an error, mean difference -14ms, 95% CI [-40.8, 12.9 ms], t(19) = -1.09, p = .29. 
So it appears that the consequences of a commission error and decision error are not the 






Fig. 7 Mean response times for four trials before and after commission errors, correct 
responses and decision errors on the 50-50 DR-SART 
 
     Turning now to the 70-30 DR-SART: RTs prior to correct withholds were 45 ms slower 
than those preceding a commission error, 95% CI [26.9, 63.4], t(16) = 5.25, p <.001 (see 
Figure 8). This result reproduces that of the Single response SART but unlike the 50:50 DR-
SART. Perhaps making an error induces a shift towards the ‘encode and check’ strategy. RTs 
before an error were faster than after it, mean difference 54.7 ms, 95% CI [22.5, 86.9 ms], 
t(16) = 3.60, p = .002, 2-tail. (3 people made no commission errors).  As in both the single 
response and 50-50 tasks, commission errors seem to bring about a change to ‘encode and 
check’. Responses are slightly slower after a decision error, mean difference = 17.9 ms, 95% 






Fig. 8 Mean response times for four trials before and after commission errors, correct 
responses and decision errors on the 70-30 DR-SART 
 
     Finally an analysis of the 90-10 DR-SART: responses prior to a correct withhold are 34 
ms slower, 95% CI =[12.2, 56.4], t(19) = 3.20, p = .004 2-tail as they have been in all except 
the 50:50 DR-SART (see Figure 9). However, responses following a commission error are 
not slower than before the error, mean difference 2.0 ms, 95% CI [-30.3,34.2], t(19) = .126, p 
= .901.  Commission errors do not appear to have a ‘corrective’ function when they occur in a 
dual task where one response is highly probable. Finally responses prior to a decision error do 
not appear to differ from those following one, mean difference 15.7 ms, 95% CI [-6.3, 37.7], 






Fig. 9 Mean response times for four trials before and after commission errors, correct 
responses and decision errors on the 90-10 DR-SART 
 
     Overall, RTs preceding a correct withhold appear to be slower than those preceding a 
commission error except in the 50-50 DR-SART.  This suggests that commission errors occur 
because people slip into an ‘encode and click’ mode until it incurs a cost except in the 50-50 
where the potential for decision errors perhaps makes ‘encode and click’ always too costly. 
Comparison of RTS either side of a commission error suggests that people are aware they 
have made an error because they slow responses following such errors. This suggests it is 
unlikely they would have been completely mindless when they made the error or they would 
not have known they made one.  But making a decision error does not seem to have the same 











     The experiments reported here investigated whether modifying the SART to include a 
response choice would reduce commission errors. We believed that requiring a choice would 
lead participants to favour an ‘encode and check’ (Peebles & Bothell, 2004) strategy, due to 
its higher utility compared to an ‘encode and click’ strategy. As predicted, commission errors 
in a 50-50 response DR-SART more than halved from near 45% in the single response 
version of the task to around 19% in the dual response condition. This reduction was similar 
in the 70-30 DR-SART (18%). Further as predicted from Peebles and Bothell’s utility model 
the proportion of commission errors was affected by the relative prevalence of the more 
common response alternative. The 90-10 dual task produced commission errors that were 
intermediate (29%) between those of the single reponse SART (45%) and 50-50 and 70-30 
(18-19%) dual tasks. This is consistent with the utility of ‘encode and click’ increasing as one 
response becomes far more common than the other. However, similarity of commission 
errors in the 50-50 and 70-30 dual tasks suggests it may be necessary for the relative 
frequency of the two responses to exceed a threshold level before the speed benefit from 
‘encode and click’ outweighs the time costs inherent with the slower ‘encode and check’ 
procedure. 
     If a slower ‘encode and check’ procedure is adopted on a greater proportion of trials in 
dual conditions, then RTs to Go stimuli should be greater in the dual conditions than in the 
single response SART but be faster when one response is far more common. Results are 
broadly consistent with this prediction: single response RTs were faster than those in all dual 
tasks; response times in the 90-10 variant were intermediate between the single task and the 
dual tasks where responses were equal (50-50) or near equal (70-30). It was also possible to 
examine the propensity for commission errors and RTs separately for each response category 
(the more common and the less common) in the dual tasks. As predicted by the Peebles & 
Bothell model, which suggests that the likelihood of the ‘encode and click’ being adopted 
increases the greater the probability of a response category, probability of a response to a No-
go stimulus being made by a particular finger lay in order (from high to low): Single, Dual 
90, Dual 70, Dual 50, Dual 30, and Dual 10. Or in other words, the probability of a 
commission error being made by a particular response finger directly reflects the frequency 
of its use.  
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     Turning now to decision errors, the probability that the wrong button will be pressed to a 
Go stimulus in a dual task appears to be inversely related to frequency of use of the 
responding finger. That is, generally decision errors occur because the more common 
response is made to rare Go stimuli. The less common response is hardly ever made to 
common Go stimuli. We interpret this result to imply that the relative utility of a rapid 
‘encode and click’ outweighs the slower ‘encode and check’ strategy the more frequently the 
stimulus class. Like commission errors, decision errors are also made by the more commonly 
used finger; decision errors had highest probability in the Dual 10 response category when an 
incorrect Dual 90 response was made, followed by the Dual 30 and so on. These results 
indicate that commission and decision errors are driven by a common factor – response 
potency. Furthermore, correct response times were also faster when a more commonly used 
response was executed.  
     Omission errors are overall relatively rare and variable between people but unlike 
commission errors they do not appear to be affected by different response probabilities in 
dual response tasks or even by whether the task is single or dual response. It is claimed (e.g. 
Robertson et al., 1997) that response repetition induces boredom which in turn leads to 
disengagement and attention lapses. By this argument, lapses, and hence commission errors, 
should be more common in the more repetitive single response SART and the 90-10 DR 
SART. But if lapses are caused by the overall level of stimulus repetition they should affect 
omission and commission errors in a similarly. That there is no relationship between 
omission and commission error rates across the variations in the levels of repetition in these 
experiments argues against an attention lapse explanation for commission errors. Further the 
fact that omissions occur rarely suggests that very few lapses do occur, or if lapses do occur 
they are too brief to be detected in the brief response windows of these experiments.  
     Having to make a response choice, even when one alternative occurs on 80% of trials 
(Dual 90-10) has a time cost relative to a single response SART. Correct responses in the 
single response SART were faster than every dual condition. It would be interesting to 
determine whether the single response speed advantage persists when the more common 
response exceeds 90% or 95% of trials. With regard to frequency of response and correct 
RTs, the trend is for responses to be faster to the more frequent stimulus class and more so 
the greater the frequency difference between high and low frequency stimuli in an 
experiment. Additionally, we have evidence that incorrect responses occur in the DR-SARTs 
when the dominant response is not restrained on infrequent Go trials and on No-Go trials. 
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This suggests a failure to withhold a pre-potent response or to adopt an ‘encode and click 
with dominant finger’ strategy when there is strong imbalance between stimulus/response 
classes in a DR-SART.  
In terms of the measurement properties of the SART 
     In addition to Peebles & Bothell's (2004) utility model, Cheyne et al.’s (2009) three-state 
attentional model of task engagement/disengagement could also provide an explanation for 
our results. Based on the three state model, it could be argued that instances of mind 
wandering increase with response potency or the adoption of the ‘encode and click’ strategy. 
What is required is the assumption that strength of a response (a product of its relative 
frequency) determines how far along the Cheyne et al. model a participant is likely to travel. 
In the case of the DR-SART, weaker response conditions like the Dual 10 and Dual 30 make 
it difficult for the participant to reach even state 1 of the model (occurrent task 
inattention/tuning out); reflected by the fact that weak responses hardly ever feature among 
commission and decision errors. The Dual 50 and 70 on the other hand would allow the 
participant to transition from state 1 to state 2 (generic task inattention/going through the 
motions). The single and Dual 90 conditions appear to carry the participant all the way to 
state 3 of the model -response disengagement as evidenced by the large number of 
commission errors present in these response categories. It could be argued that every time a 
commission error is made, the participant resets back to the starting point on the three state 
model; ‘slowly’ working their way back to state 3 and the next commission error (similar to 
Peebles and Bothell’s dynamic utility. 
     The results from the 90-10 DR-SART reveal that it is not just adding a decision 
component that reduces commission errors; greater frequency of a particular motor response 
itself results in a greater probability of error (errors of commission in the 90-10 DR-SART 
are significantly greater than the 50-50 DR-SART). With regard to response strategy and the 
speed-accuracy trade-off, Peebles and Bothell’s model provide an interpretation of our results 
that can account for both. The ‘encode and click’ strategy is quicker but more likely to 
produce commission errors; the reverse is true for the ‘encode and check’ strategy. From a 
response inhibition point of view, our results could indicate that the difficulty associated with 
inhibiting the pre-potent response is directly proportional to the potency of the response 
category, i.e. more commission errors/unable to inhibit a response in the single and dual 90 as 
illustrated by our results.      
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The consequences of an error 
     Robertson et al. (1997) explored the effects of commission errors on subsequent Go RTs 
by comparing RTs on the four trials before and the four trials after a correct withhold (No-
Go) and similarly either side of a commission error in their SART. Results from their control 
subjects (without traumatic brain injury) suggested that RTs to Go stimuli decreased as trials 
progressed until production of a commission error led to a slowed response on the next Go 
trial followed by a gradual speeding of responses as trials progressed. Two findings led to this 
conclusion. First RTs to Go stimuli prior to a No-Go stimulus were longer preceding a correct 
response than preceding a commission error. Secondly RTs to Go stimuli that followed a 
commission error were slower those preceding it, while RTs to Go stimuli before a correct 
withhold were slower than those following a correct withhold. These results were replicated 
in the current single response SART, and DUAL 70-30 SART and partially in the 50-50 DR 
SART and 90-10 DR SART suggesting that even in the context of the potential for decision 
accuracy feedback on every Go trial a commission error still leads participants to change their 
strategy by reducing RTs to following Go stimuli.  
    Robertson et al. and others ascribe the pattern of RTs surrounding No-go stimuli to 
subjects adopting a more conservative response criterion, or because they inhibit automatic 
response to a greater degree after an error. The patterns are also consistent with the view that 
cognizance of an error causes a shift from an ‘encode and click’ to an ‘encode and check’ 
strategy but without invoking any attention processes. Change in strategy consequent upon a 
commission requires some level of registration that an error has been made. This in turn 
requires that the stimulus be identified at some level. Identification of a stimulus at a 
conscious level is not possible when sustained attention, as defined by Robertson et al.(1997) 
and Langner & Eichoff (2013), is lapsed or disengaged at the moment the stimulus is 
presented. That is, change of strategy following a commission error is incompatible with 
there being a lapse of sustained attention, but lapse of attention is used to explain the 
existence of the commission error. This contradiction is avoided when notions of attention are 
avoided, as is in the dynamic utility model proposed by Peebles & Bothell.    
     Perhaps surprisingly there was no similar increase in RTs following decision errors. This 
raises the question as to whether production of a response when none is sanctioned is in some 
sense more noxious than production of an incorrect response when a response is required. 
Alternatively, because in these experiments multiple stimuli were mapped to each Go 
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response, and the stimuli did not inherently denote which finger to respond with, decision 
errors may not have been immediately and sufficiently obvious to result in a change of 
strategy. 
     Those who have been critical of the validity of the SART as a measure of sustained 
attention seem to overlook what Robertson and colleagues found in their initial work. Normal 
control participants slowed down after making a commission error, they learnt from their 
mistakes.  To do that, normal subjects must have registered of the stimulus’s identity. There 
was no stimulus decoupling with them.  In fact, as Robertson and colleagues explain, a pre-
potent motor response was set up, but to keep it under control they had to pay attention to 
stimulus identity, and they did because they corrected their strategy following a commission 
error. The TBI patients however, did not slow down following a commission error. They did 
not learn from their mistakes. One reason could be that they may not have registered stimulus 
identity because they were unable to sustain attention in which case the SART can be a valid 
measure of sustained attention after all.  Studies questioning the validity of the SART as a 
measure of sustained attention have not explored how TBI (or other groups) behaved in their 
variants of the task. 
 
     Consider the nature of the SART.  The subject has to respond to every digit except one. 
The same response is made to 8 out of 9 of the stimuli which also vary in font size. The 
subject is instructed to respond as quickly as possible. In this context it is reasonable to 
suppose that an intelligent subject will try to find features that are common to all Go stimuli. 
All Go stimuli share one property: sudden onset, which is known to be a strong attractor of 
attention (Yantis, 2005). Consequently it is reasonable to suppose that subjects link response 
production to any sudden onset event, disregarding variations in their identity. Because No-
go stimuli are relatively rare, commission errors occur. By this argument the commission 
errors do not necessarily result from lapses in sustained attention. In one sense the subject 
never attends to the stimulus, in another sense the subject always attends to one property of 
the stimulus, its sudden onset. But normal subjects do attend to stimulus identity, because 
they slow down following an error. TBI patients also attend to the common feature of the 
stimuli (their sudden onset), otherwise they would not respond at all to the Go stimuli and 
they would make very large numbers of omission errors, which they don’t. Consequently 
even TBI patients must be sustaining their attention in some way. What TBI patients do not 
do is to alter their behaviour when they do make an error. The important question is why they 
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don’t alter their strategy following an error. Although our experiments establish strongly (as 
Robertson et al. supposed) the importance of a pre-potent response in Go No-Go situations 
and while they also support a viable non attention explanation for the occurrence of 
commission errors and RT patterns surrounding No-Go stimuli, they don’t address why 
individuals with TBI’s fail to learn from their mistakes. 
 
     Future experiments could fill out the DR-SART series with 80-20 and 95-5 or even more 
extreme response probabilities. Responses can be speeded overall by using more response 
compatible stimuli such as left and right pointing arrows for left and right responses, with a 
double headed or no headed arrow (line) as the No-Go stimulus.  In the SART many different 
stimuli are mapped to a single response (8 to be precise). The participant searches for what is 
common to them all – sudden onset and uses that as the cue to produce a response. If this is 
true, reducing the stimulus set to just two very clearly discernible stimuli (e.g. large red 
circle, vs. small blue triangle) should reduce the incidence of commission errors greatly. On 
the other hand, if it is the pre-potence of a response that drives commission errors, using such 
saliently different stimuli should have little effect. It is also possible that sudden onsets (in 
natural settings these would signify object movement) inherently capture attention (e.g. 
Yantis, 2005) and fire a pre-potent response. Therefore manipulations where stimuli inset was 
gradual may reduce commission errors. Gradual onsets could be achieved by displaying 
stimuli pixel by pixel or by gradually increasing contrast of their contours.  
 
     In conclusion, the DR-SARTS along with Peebles and Bothell’s model provide an 
explanation in terms of utility, that has no place for attention or mind wandering etc. but is 
able to account for the results and therefore presents a viable challenge to explanations of 
commission errors in the broader family of Go – No-Go tasks. Additionally, the rarity of 
omission errors and their independence of response strength variations suggest that attention 
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